git-automation
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 17, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The workflow defined in
RELEASE-NOTES.mdcreates a surface for indirect prompt injection by ingesting and processing untrusted data from external sources.\n - Ingestion points: Steps 3 and 5 in
RELEASE-NOTES.mduse the GitHub CLI (gh api,gh pr view) to fetch commit messages, PR titles, and PR descriptions from external repositories.\n - Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify the use of delimiters or 'ignore' instructions to prevent the agent from following commands that might be embedded in the ingested commit or PR text.\n
- Capability inventory: The skill is designed to read data from the GitHub API and write results to the local filesystem (e.g.,
releases-docs/releases/).\n - Sanitization: No sanitization, escaping, or validation logic is present to handle the untrusted external content before it is processed by the AI.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill includes reference materials that instruct the agent or user to execute various shell commands for repository maintenance and environment setup.\n
- Evidence:
references/automation-scripts-toolkit.mdcontains commands for deleting directories (rm -rf node_modules .next), pruning branches (git fetch --prune), and managing stacked PRs (gt restack).\n- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The automation toolkit utilizes external package managers and runtimes to execute DevOps tooling.\n - Evidence:
references/automation-scripts-toolkit.mdreferences the use ofnpxto download and executesemantic-releaseandgitleaks. It also includes instructions involving thebunruntime and thegt(Graphite) CLI tool.
Audit Metadata