pdf-pro
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 13, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to extract text and structured data from user-provided PDF files. This extracted content is then interpolated into prompts for AI models to perform semantic analysis.
- Ingestion points: PDF files are processed using libraries like
unpdf,pdfplumber, andpypdfas described inSKILL.md,PDF-PROCESSING.md, andreferences/1-ai-extraction-patterns.md. - Boundary markers: The implementation examples (notably in
references/1-ai-extraction-patterns.md) do not demonstrate the use of strict delimiters or instructions to ignore potential commands embedded within the extracted PDF text when passing it to an LLM. - Capability inventory: The skill utilizes tools with significant capabilities, including shell execution for structural repairs (
qpdf,poppler-utils), file system writes for document generation, and network access via headless browsers (Puppeteer) for HTML-to-PDF conversion. - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or filtering of the extracted text is shown before it is included in the LLM prompt, which is an inherent risk in document processing workflows.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/fill_fillable_fields.pyperforms a runtime monkeypatch of thepypdflibrary to fix a specific bug in its handling of selection list fields. - Evidence: The function
monkeypatch_pydpf_methodredefinesDictionaryObject.get_inheritedat runtime. While this is documented as a necessary workaround for a library limitation, runtime modification of third-party code is a dynamic execution pattern that should be monitored.
Audit Metadata