subagent-orchestrator
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 17, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill establishes a multi-agent orchestration architecture where a supervisor agent ingests, validates, and acts upon outputs generated by subagents.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context via subagent execution results (referenced in
delegateTasklogic) and handoff logs analyzed by the system. - Boundary markers: The protocol uses a "Manifest of Objective" to define subagent goals, but lacks explicit delimiters or instructions to treat subagent output as potentially adversarial content.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to execute local scripts (
scripts/monitor-delegation.ts,scripts/validate-handoff.py) and utilizes the Model Context Protocol (MCP) to access external tools and databases. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, escaping, or filtering of the content returned by subagents before it is processed by the parent agent.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions reference and utilize local scripts for monitoring and validation purposes.
- Evidence: The documentation points to
scripts/monitor-delegation.tsfor real-time visualization andscripts/validate-handoff.pyfor analyzing handoff logs. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill uses the local file system to store and retrieve persistent execution plans, which involves accessing a hidden directory in the user's home path.
- Evidence: The Conductor's Protocol and Plan-Synced Execution rules require the agent to read and write data to
~/.gemini/plans/for session recovery and verification.
Audit Metadata