weibo-hot-scraper
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 6, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill generates and executes a Node.js HTTP server script at runtime. The instructions provide a JavaScript template for an HTTP service that is written to a file and executed in the background to facilitate data storage, which bypasses context window limitations and static analysis of the runtime environment.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses shell commands with the
run_in_background: trueflag to start a persistent local Node.js service and perform file system operations via generated scripts. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from external Weibo search results and user posts, which could contain instructions targeting the agent or the Markdown consumer.
- Ingestion points: External Weibo content scraped from
s.weibo.comin steps 2 and 4. - Boundary markers: None identified; scraped content is placed directly into Markdown blocks without clear delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses file-write capabilities (
fs.writeFileSync), background process execution, and broad browser automation tools. - Sanitization: There is no explicit sanitization, filtering, or escaping mentioned for the external content before it is processed into final documents.
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes the
browser_run_code_unsafetool to execute arbitrary, skill-defined JavaScript within the browser context to extract data and interact with the local persistence server. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs the user to install and trust the
@playwright/mcppackage. This is a reference to a well-known service and is documented here for completeness.
Audit Metadata