multi-perspective-analysis

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 8, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection due to the way it handles user-provided analysis material.
  • Ingestion points: In SKILL.md, 'Stage 2: Prepare Materials' involves collecting user files or dialogue text which is then labeled as 'Analysis Material'.
  • Boundary markers: The sub-agent prompt template in SKILL.md (Stage 3) uses basic markdown headers like '## 分析素材' (Analysis Material) to separate user data from instructions, but it does not employ robust delimiters or 'ignore instructions' wrappers to prevent the sub-agent from following commands embedded within the user material.
  • Capability inventory: Sub-agents are explicitly instructed to use the Read tool to access reference files and the Write tool to save their reports to the local filesystem (多视角分析/ directory).
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, escaping, or filtering of the user-provided content before it is interpolated into the agent's context.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill features a mechanism to fetch external information to expand its knowledge base.
  • Evidence: SKILL.md (Stage 1) and the _how-to-create-reference.md guide describe using the WebSearch tool to gather data for 'Custom Perspectives' and persisting that information into local reference files.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The instructions require the agent to execute shell commands to manage the analysis workflow.
  • Evidence: SKILL.md (Stage 3 and Stage 5) contains instructions for the agent to use the mkdir -p command to create specific directory structures for storing analysis reports.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 8, 2026, 10:02 PM