multi-perspective-analysis
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 8, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection due to the way it handles user-provided analysis material.
- Ingestion points: In
SKILL.md, 'Stage 2: Prepare Materials' involves collecting user files or dialogue text which is then labeled as 'Analysis Material'. - Boundary markers: The sub-agent prompt template in
SKILL.md(Stage 3) uses basic markdown headers like '## 分析素材' (Analysis Material) to separate user data from instructions, but it does not employ robust delimiters or 'ignore instructions' wrappers to prevent the sub-agent from following commands embedded within the user material. - Capability inventory: Sub-agents are explicitly instructed to use the
Readtool to access reference files and theWritetool to save their reports to the local filesystem (多视角分析/directory). - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, escaping, or filtering of the user-provided content before it is interpolated into the agent's context.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill features a mechanism to fetch external information to expand its knowledge base.
- Evidence:
SKILL.md(Stage 1) and the_how-to-create-reference.mdguide describe using theWebSearchtool to gather data for 'Custom Perspectives' and persisting that information into local reference files. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The instructions require the agent to execute shell commands to manage the analysis workflow.
- Evidence:
SKILL.md(Stage 3 and Stage 5) contains instructions for the agent to use themkdir -pcommand to create specific directory structures for storing analysis reports.
Audit Metadata