ralph-loop-yylo

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 21, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to process external task data from a controller, which introduces a surface for instructions that could attempt to manipulate the agent's behavior.
  • Ingestion points: The skill utilizes the $ARGUMENTS placeholder in SKILL.md and explicitly directs the agent to read the "complete assigned task" from a canonical controller in references/implement.md.
  • Boundary markers: The instructions contain directives to "Preserve task references and directives literally" and "Stay within the assigned task", which provide guidance but do not programmatically enforce isolation from adversarial inputs.
  • Capability inventory: The agent has the authority to modify files, perform git operations, and execute local CLI tools (yy task, yy merge) within the product worktree.
  • Sanitization: No explicit content sanitization, filtering, or instruction-override protection is documented for the external task data being processed.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The scripts/kanban.sh script employs dynamic execution techniques to manage the skill's runtime environment.
  • Evidence: The script uses eval to execute shell commands and environment variable exports produced by the controller_resolver.py script.
  • Evidence: The script uses exec to invoke Python-based helper scripts (e2e_sweep_helper.py, e2e_housekeeping.py) to perform validation and auditing logic at runtime.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill's primary function involves orchestrating multiple command-line utilities to manage the development lifecycle.
  • Evidence: references/implement.md and scripts/kanban.sh contain logic to execute git, yylo-ledger, juno-kanban, and various yy subcommands to fulfill task implementation and record-keeping requirements.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 21, 2026, 08:12 PM