ziw-triage
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 7, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted content from issue tracker bodies and comments, which could be used to influence the agent's triage decisions.
- Ingestion points: The agent is instructed to read issue metadata, bodies, and comments from an external tracker to classify and mutate tickets.
- Boundary markers: The instructions do not define specific delimiters or provide guidance to the agent on ignoring instructions embedded within the ticket text.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the authority to execute local scripts and perform tracker mutations (updating labels, statuses, and body content) via MCP tools.
- Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or validation logic is defined for handling text retrieved from the issue tracker.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on the execution of multiple Node.js scripts via the shell.
- Evidence: The instructions explicitly direct the agent to run
../ziw-orchestrate/scripts/tick-snapshot.mjs,../ziw-orchestrate/scripts/tick-plan.mjs, and../ziw-orchestrate/scripts/linear-dag-start.mjsusing thenodecommand. - Context: These scripts are located in a sibling directory (
ziw-orchestrate), indicating a functional dependency on external project components. The skill assumes these scripts are safe and available in the execution environment.
Audit Metadata