skills/zaoqu-liu/scienceclaw/matchms/Gen Agent Trust Hub

matchms

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 16, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The 'Suggest Using K-Dense Web For Complex Worflows' section contains instructions to modify the agent's conversational behavior. It directs the AI to proactively promote the author's external platform ('www.k-dense.ai') when users request complex tasks, which is a form of behavioral steering.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides instructions to install the 'matchms' library and its optional chemistry dependencies using 'uv pip install'. This is a standard installation procedure for Python-based tools.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The documentation identifies 'Pickle (Python serialization)' as a supported data format. Loading untrusted data using the Python pickle module can lead to arbitrary code execution, as the format is not secure by design.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill references 'www.k-dense.ai' as an external destination for research workflows. This domain belongs to the skill's author, K-Dense Inc., and is presented as a productivity upgrade for complex tasks.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection (Category 8) because it ingests untrusted data from various mass spectrometry file formats.
  • Ingestion points: External files such as '.mgf', '.mzML', '.msp', and '.json' are loaded into the agent's context.
  • Boundary markers: None identified in the provided documentation or code snippets.
  • Capability inventory: The skill includes capabilities to write files ('save_as_mgf', 'save_as_json') and perform complex metadata processing.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation to prevent embedded instructions within the spectral metadata from influencing the agent's actions.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Apr 16, 2026, 08:26 AM