antigravity-cli
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 5, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPRIVILEGE_ESCALATION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill instructs the agent to read and analyze potentially untrusted data from the Antigravity CLI's local storage. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection if the files contain malicious instructions.
- Ingestion points: The agent is directed to use
read_fileon log files (~/.gemini/antigravity-cli/log/cli-*.log), conversation histories (~/.gemini/antigravity-cli/conversations/), and brain artifacts. - Capability inventory: The agent has access to the
terminaltool, which can execute shell commands. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit instructions or delimiters provided to ensure the agent ignores instructions embedded within the data it reads.
- Sanitization: The skill does not implement validation or sanitization of the content found in logs or history files before processing.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill is centered around executing shell commands via the
terminaltool. It provides a comprehensive reference for theagyCLI's command surface, which includes the ability to run arbitrary shell commands through the CLI's internal prompt helpers (documented as!). - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The documentation within the skill (
references/cli-docs.md) describes installation methods that fetch scripts fromhttps://antigravity.google/and pipe them directly into system shells (bash,PowerShell, orCMD). These resources originate from the official infrastructure of a well-known service. - [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The skill documents the use of the
--dangerously-skip-permissionsflag. This flag is designed to bypass the CLI's internal security prompts and permission checks during execution, which could be leveraged to perform sensitive actions without standard oversight.
Audit Metadata