bioinformatics
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 5, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to clone external repositories from
github.com/GPTomics/bioSkillsandgithub.com/ClawBio/ClawBioand execute scripts or pipelines contained within them. This allows for the execution of untrusted code from sources that are not recognized as trusted vendors. - [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The instructions command the agent to use
sudo apt installfor installing system-level bioinformatics tools. Invokingsudogrants the agent elevated permissions and risks full system compromise. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill performs shallow clones of external GitHub repositories to the
/tmpdirectory. These downloads originate from entities outside the known trusted infrastructure. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes multiple shell commands to modify the system environment, including
pip install,Rscript -e 'BiocManager::install()', andconda install, which introduce unverified third-party dependencies. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to fetch and read documentation and instructions from external repositories (e.g., using
catonSKILL.mdorREADME.md) to guide its behavior. It lacks any boundary markers or sanitization to prevent malicious instructions embedded in that content from influencing the agent. - Ingestion points:
catcommands reading from cloned repository files in/tmp. - Boundary markers: None present to distinguish external content from trusted instructions.
- Capability inventory: Includes
git clone,pip install,sudo apt install, and execution of external shell scripts. - Sanitization: No filtering or validation of the fetched content is performed.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata