dynamic-skill-dispatcher
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 5, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an attack surface for indirect prompt injection by ingesting and processing untrusted task descriptions and context data.
- Ingestion points: The
execute_dynamic_dispatchandanalyze_task_requirementsmethods inSKILL.mdaccepttaskandcontextobjects as input. - Boundary markers: The provided code snippets do not show any use of delimiters or instructions to the agent to ignore embedded commands within the ingested data.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses significant capabilities, including the ability to execute other skills, MCP servers, and external AI agents via the
ExecutionOrchestratorclass inSKILL.md. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of input validation, escaping, or filtering of the task data before it is used to influence routing decisions or passed to execution targets.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill is designed to perform runtime selection and execution of components. The
ExecutionOrchestratorlogic inSKILL.mduses computed identifiers (e.g.,optimal_target.target_id) to invokeexecute_skill,execute_mcp, andexecute_agent. This dynamic invocation pattern determines the agent's behavior at runtime based on potentially untrusted task characteristics. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The usage examples in
SKILL.mddemonstrate invoking a Python script (tools/dynamic_skill_dispatcher.py) with various command-line arguments derived from user input, such as--taskand--code-path. The script itself is not provided in the skill files, which prevents verification of how these arguments are handled and whether they are vulnerable to command injection.
Audit Metadata