dynamic-skill-dispatcher

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 5, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an attack surface for indirect prompt injection by ingesting and processing untrusted task descriptions and context data.
  • Ingestion points: The execute_dynamic_dispatch and analyze_task_requirements methods in SKILL.md accept task and context objects as input.
  • Boundary markers: The provided code snippets do not show any use of delimiters or instructions to the agent to ignore embedded commands within the ingested data.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses significant capabilities, including the ability to execute other skills, MCP servers, and external AI agents via the ExecutionOrchestrator class in SKILL.md.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of input validation, escaping, or filtering of the task data before it is used to influence routing decisions or passed to execution targets.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill is designed to perform runtime selection and execution of components. The ExecutionOrchestrator logic in SKILL.md uses computed identifiers (e.g., optimal_target.target_id) to invoke execute_skill, execute_mcp, and execute_agent. This dynamic invocation pattern determines the agent's behavior at runtime based on potentially untrusted task characteristics.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The usage examples in SKILL.md demonstrate invoking a Python script (tools/dynamic_skill_dispatcher.py) with various command-line arguments derived from user input, such as --task and --code-path. The script itself is not provided in the skill files, which prevents verification of how these arguments are handled and whether they are vulnerable to command injection.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 5, 2026, 12:07 PM