godmode
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 5, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHPROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONOBFUSCATIONPERSISTENCEPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill contains a comprehensive database of 'jailbreak' templates (GODMODE, L1B3RT4S, Parseltongue) specifically designed to override LLM safety guardrails and established behavioral guidelines.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: Multiple scripts, including
scripts/load_godmode.pyandscripts/auto_jailbreak.py, utilize theexec()andcompile()functions to dynamically execute Python code from the local filesystem at runtime. This practice circumvents static analysis and introduces risks if the filesystem content is manipulated. - [OBFUSCATION]: The
scripts/parseltongue.pyengine implements 33 distinct techniques to hide 'trigger words' from safety classifiers. These techniques include Unicode homoglyph substitution, zero-width joiner insertion, Base64 encoding, and multi-layer obfuscation (e.g., 'Triple' layer combining leetspeak, Unicode, and case rotation). - [PERSISTENCE]: The
auto_jailbreak()function inscripts/auto_jailbreak.pypersistently modifies the agent's global configuration file (~/.hermes/config.yaml) by writing a jailbreaksystem_promptand configuringprefill_messages_file. This ensures the safety-bypass state remains active across all future agent sessions until manually undone. - [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: By modifying the core
config.yaml, the skill effectively escalates its influence over the agent's operating environment, allowing it to bypass global safety constraints that would otherwise be enforced by the platform. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill facilitates sending user data and canary queries to over 55 external AI models via the OpenRouter API (
https://openrouter.ai/api/v1) to identify models with the least restrictive content filters.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata