human-memory-emulation
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 23, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/check_hermes_ebbinghaus.pyperforms dynamic code loading by modifyingsys.pathwith a path provided via the--repocommand-line argument. It subsequently imports and executes code from theplugins.memorypackage within that directory. This allows for arbitrary code execution if the agent is directed to run the script against an untrusted or compromised directory. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
SKILL.mdinstructions direct the agent to execute shell commands and Python scripts using local environment variables (e.g.,$env:USERPROFILE) and user-supplied repository paths. This includes runningpytestand diagnostic scripts that interact with the local filesystem and external repository code. - [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The skill is designed to read local configuration files (
config.yaml) and access SQLite database files (ebbinghaus_memory.db) within the$HERMES_HOMEdirectory. While these are required for the skill's stated purpose of managing the Hermes memory provider, they represent access to potentially sensitive application data. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted text as 'memories' for storage and retrieval. This creates an attack surface where malicious instructions embedded in stored data could influence the agent's behavior during the 'recall' or 'rehearse' actions.
- Ingestion points: External text stored via the
rememberaction inSKILL.mdandscripts/check_hermes_ebbinghaus.py. - Boundary markers: None identified in the provided schema to distinguish between data and instructions.
- Capability inventory: File system access (SQLite), shell command execution (pytest), and dynamic Python code loading.
- Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or validation of the memory content is performed before processing.
Audit Metadata