jupyter-live-kernel
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 5, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCREDENTIALS_UNSAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill fetches an external repository and executes code from it.
- Evidence: The instructions require
git clone https://github.com/hamelsmu/hamelnb.gitfollowed byuv run "$SCRIPT", where the script is part of the cloned repository. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill relies on code downloaded from a third-party source not identified as a trusted vendor.
- Evidence:
git clone https://github.com/hamelsmu/hamelnb.git ~/.agent-skills/hamelnb. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The setup instructions explicitly disable Jupyter's built-in security features.
- Evidence:
jupyter-lab --no-browser ... --IdentityProvider.token='' --ServerApp.password=''. Disabling tokens and passwords allows any process with local access to the port to execute arbitrary code in the kernel. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill facilitates the execution of arbitrary shell and Python commands.
- Evidence: Frequent use of
uv runto execute the downloaded script with user-supplied arguments and--codeflags. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill provides a surface for indirect prompt injection by ingesting and executing content from notebook files and code strings.
- Ingestion points:
SKILL.md(via--pathand--codearguments). - Boundary markers: None present.
- Capability inventory: Arbitrary Python execution, server management, and file editing.
- Sanitization: None provided; the skill is designed to execute raw code inputs.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The core functionality involves the dynamic execution of Python code within a persistent kernel session.
- Evidence: The
executesubcommand takes arbitrary strings to run in the Jupyter environment.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata