llava
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 5, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs the agent to clone the project from its official GitHub repository and install dependencies using pip. It also specifies downloading pre-trained model weights from Hugging Face (e.g.,
liuhaotian/llava-v1.5-7b). These actions are standard for the deployment of this specific open-source architecture. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill includes shell commands for launching a Gradio web server, running a command-line interface for model interaction, and executing training pipelines via
bashanddeepspeed. These commands are essential for the primary functionality of using and fine-tuning the model. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The model is designed to process external images and user-provided text instructions, which represents an inherent attack surface for multimodal AI. Malicious instructions could potentially be embedded within images or prompts processed by the model.
- Ingestion points: External images loaded via
PIL.Image.openand user text prompts appended to conversation templates inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The skill uses conversation templates (
conv_templates["llava_v1"]) to structure inputs, which provides some structural separation between user input and model instructions. - Capability inventory: The skill facilitates repository cloning, package installation, shell script execution for training, and writing local JSON configuration files.
- Sanitization: There is no explicit evidence of input sanitization or filtering for the image or text content before processing.
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