openclaw-migration
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 5, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFE
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from the local file system, specifically reading from
MEMORY.md,USER.md, andSOUL.mdin the~/.openclawdirectory withinscripts/openclaw_to_hermes.py. This data is subsequently merged into the agent's long-term memory. Although the script uses a delimiter (§) to separate entries, it does not sanitize the content for embedded Natural Language instructions or markdown escapes. A malicious source file could influence agent behavior once imported. The skill has significant capabilities, including modifyingconfig.yamland.envfiles. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes a local Python migration script
scripts/openclaw_to_hermes.pywhich performs broad file system operations (read, write, delete, and backup) across the user's home directory. It also modifies the agent's security posture by mergingexec-approvals.jsonpatterns into the Hermescommand_allowlistconfiguration. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The migration process involves reading and writing sensitive credentials such as
OPENAI_API_KEY,ANTHROPIC_API_KEY, andTELEGRAM_BOT_TOKENto the destination.envfile. The script includes a redaction function (redact_migration_value) to prevent secrets from appearing in the generated migration reports, but the underlying operations handle plain-text secrets.
Audit Metadata