qmd
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 5, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONPERSISTENCEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill installs the
@tobilu/qmdpackage from the npm registry and automatically downloads approximately 2GB of local GGUF models from external sources during the first run.\n- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: Fetches and executes a Node.js setup script fromdeb.nodesource.comusing a shell pipe (curl | bash). This targets a well-known service for development environment configuration.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses theterminal()tool to executeqmd,npm,brew,systemctl, andlaunchctlcommands to manage search collections and services.\n- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses sensitive local directories, including meeting transcripts, personal notes, and project documentation, to build its search index and retrieve document content.\n- [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: Utilizessudofor installing Node.js and system-level packages on Linux systems.\n- [PERSISTENCE]: Provides instructions to configure background services to maintain the search daemon across sessions usinglaunchdon macOS (creating a.plistfile inLaunchAgents) andsystemdon Linux (creating a user service). This persistence is intended to keep the search models loaded in memory.\n- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has a vulnerability surface for indirect prompt injection.\n - Ingestion points: The skill retrieves content from potentially untrusted local files, notes, and meeting transcripts using
qmd searchandqmd getcommands.\n - Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or warnings to ignore embedded instructions are provided in the prompt templates.\n
- Capability inventory: The agent can execute shell commands via
terminal()and use MCP tools to interact with searched data.\n - Sanitization: No sanitization or filtering of the retrieved document content is performed before it is added to the agent's context.
Audit Metadata