researcher
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 5, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted content from external web searches and the local codebase, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Data is ingested via the
web_searchtool andread_filetool as defined inagents/openai.yamlandSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The system prompt in
agents/openai.yamllacks explicit instructions to treat retrieved data as untrusted or to ignore instructions embedded within it. - Capability inventory: The agent has permissions for network access (
https://*) and local file writes to./artifactsand./research-reports. - Sanitization: No specific sanitization or validation logic is present in the provided scripts or prompts to handle adversarial content in search results.
Audit Metadata