sora
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 5, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests user-provided text to construct prompts for the Sora video API. While it employs a structured template in
scripts/sora.py, it does not utilize explicit boundary markers or delimiters for user input, which is a standard surface for indirect prompt injection where malicious instructions in the input might influence the agent's behavior. - Evidence:
- Ingestion: User prompts via
--promptor--prompt-filearguments. - Capabilities: The agent has network access to the OpenAI API and local file system write access for video assets.
- Sanitization: No explicit content filtering or escaping of user strings is performed before interpolation into the prompt template.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on the execution of a local Python script (
scripts/sora.py) to perform its primary functions. The script correctly limits file operations to paths provided as arguments and includes checks for existing files. - Evidence:
- Script Path:
scripts/sora.pyis invoked usinguv runorpythonas described inreferences/cli.md. - Operations: The script performs file reads (prompts/images) and writes (JSON job details and binary video data).
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill facilitates the download of video and image assets from OpenAI's official API domains (
api.openai.com). - Evidence:
- The
downloadcommand inscripts/sora.pyfetches content from OpenAI's video delivery infrastructure, which is a well-known service.
Audit Metadata