telephony
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 5, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill implements a mechanism to poll inbound SMS messages via the
twilio-inboxcommand, which introduces a surface for indirect prompt injection from untrusted external senders.\n - Ingestion points: The
_twilio_inboxfunction inscripts/telephony.pyretrieves raw message bodies from the Twilio REST API.\n - Boundary markers: The script does not wrap retrieved messages in protective delimiters or provide instructions to the agent to ignore embedded commands within the SMS text.\n
- Capability inventory: The telephony script possesses capabilities to send messages, place phone calls, and modify local configuration files (
~/.hermes/.env).\n - Sanitization: The retrieved message content is processed and returned to the agent without sanitization or filtering for potential injection patterns.\n- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The
vapi-import-twiliofunctionality reads sensitive Twilio credentials (Account SID and Auth Token) from the local~/.hermes/.envfile and transmits them to the Vapi API endpoint (https://api.vapi.ai/phone-number). While this is a documented integration feature, it involves the automated transfer of secrets between different third-party service infrastructures.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions guide the agent to execute Python scripts where sensitive API keys and authentication tokens are provided as plain-text command-line arguments (e.g., usingsave-twilioorsave-bland). This can result in credential exposure within shell history files or system-level process monitoring tools.
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