webhook-subscriptions
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 5, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill allows external, untrusted data from webhooks to be directly interpolated into agent prompts using templates like
--prompt "New GitHub issue #{issue.number}: {issue.title}". - Ingestion points: Incoming HTTP POST requests from external services (GitHub, GitLab, Stripe, etc.) described in
SKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The documentation does not specify the use of delimiters (e.g., XML tags, triple backticks) or specific instructions to the agent to ignore embedded commands within the interpolated payload data.
- Capability inventory: Agents triggered by these webhooks can be configured with powerful skills (e.g.,
github-code-review), which could be subverted if the payload contains malicious instructions. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of input validation, filtering, or escaping for the data fields extracted from the JSON payloads.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The documentation instructs users to perform administrative tasks via shell commands, including manual configuration of system services (
systemctl), gateway execution, and network health checks (curl). While these are standard for setup, they represent the skill's operational footprint on the host system.
Audit Metadata