meeting-follow-up-pipeline
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 25, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes potentially untrusted data from meeting notes and transcripts, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection attacks.
- Ingestion points: Accesses data from
[MEETING NOTES TOOL](transcripts/notes) and[EMAIL](SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: Absent. The instructions do not specify any delimiters or safety markers to isolate untrusted input from the agent's core logic.
- Capability inventory: The agent has the capability to draft messages in
[EMAIL]and[CHAT]and propose additions to a[TASK SYSTEM](SKILL.md). - Sanitization: Absent. There is no evidence of data validation or sanitization of the external content before processing.
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