zeabur-file
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 4, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: Uses
npxto download and execute thezeaburCLI tool from the npm registry to perform file operations.\n- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Retrieves project archives from Zeabur servers based on user-provided upload identifiers using thefile pullcommand.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Employs standard shell utilities such asls,cat, andfindto explore the contents of the downloaded project. The use of<upload_id>in shell commands could potentially lead to command injection if the identifier extracted from the user message is not properly validated by the agent.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it reads and processes the contents of untrusted project files.\n - Ingestion points: User-uploaded files are pulled into the local
/tmp/projectdirectory (SKILL.md).\n - Boundary markers: Absent; the instructions do not specify delimiters or warnings to ignore instructions found within the downloaded files.\n
- Capability inventory: The agent can list files, read contents, and execute shell commands within its environment (SKILL.md).\n
- Sanitization: None; the skill reads file content directly into the agent context for analysis.
Audit Metadata