zeabur-template-backup

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 18, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from external sources that could contain malicious instructions or malformed content designed to exploit the agent's capabilities.
  • Ingestion points: User-provided template URLs and the metadata fields of downloaded YAML files (SKILL.md).
  • Boundary markers: The instructions do not define boundary markers or instruct the agent to ignore embedded instructions in the processed data.
  • Capability inventory: The skill utilizes several powerful shell commands including curl, grep, mkdir, mv, and git (SKILL.md).
  • Sanitization: Although the skill suggests converting template names to kebab-case, the initial extraction and use of the template code from the URL are not sanitized.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Shell commands are constructed using variables derived from external/user input, creating a potential vector for command injection.
  • The {TEMPLATE_CODE} variable is interpolated directly into a curl command (SKILL.md).
  • The {service-name} variable, derived from the template's YAML content, is used in mkdir and mv commands (SKILL.md).
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Fetches template configuration files from the developer's official domain at zeabur.com (SKILL.md).
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: Instructs the agent to execute the latest version of the vendor's CLI tool using npx zeabur@latest, which involves downloading and running code from a remote registry at runtime (SKILL.md).
Recommendations
  • HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://zeabur.com/templates/{TEMPLATE_CODE}.yaml - DO NOT USE without thorough review
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Sep 18, 2026, 04:29 PM