using-superpowers

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 15, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill uses imperative and forceful language (e.g., 'ABSOLUTELY MUST', 'IF A SKILL APPLIES TO YOUR TASK, YOU DO NOT HAVE A CHOICE') to override default agent behavior and force the invocation of external skill tools before any response or action.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill establishes a protocol where external data is loaded into the agent's context and followed with high priority.
  • Ingestion points: Data enters the context via the output of the Skill tool (or platform equivalents like activate_skill, read_skill, and skill).
  • Boundary markers: Absent. While the instructions allow the agent to ignore a skill if it is 'wrong for the situation', there are no explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the loaded content.
  • Capability inventory: Across the referenced files, the agent is granted access to file system operations (Read, Write, Edit), shell command execution (Bash, terminal), and network fetching (WebFetch, fetch).
  • Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the content returned by external skills is performed before the agent is instructed to follow it exactly.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The references/codex-tools.md file provides a framework for the dynamic assembly of prompts by reading template files, filling placeholders with context, and spawning new subagents using the resulting instructions.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 15, 2026, 03:30 AM