using-superpowers
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill uses imperative and forceful language (e.g., 'ABSOLUTELY MUST', 'IF A SKILL APPLIES TO YOUR TASK, YOU DO NOT HAVE A CHOICE') to override default agent behavior and force the invocation of external skill tools before any response or action.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill establishes a protocol where external data is loaded into the agent's context and followed with high priority.
- Ingestion points: Data enters the context via the output of the
Skilltool (or platform equivalents likeactivate_skill,read_skill, andskill). - Boundary markers: Absent. While the instructions allow the agent to ignore a skill if it is 'wrong for the situation', there are no explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the loaded content.
- Capability inventory: Across the referenced files, the agent is granted access to file system operations (
Read,Write,Edit), shell command execution (Bash,terminal), and network fetching (WebFetch,fetch). - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the content returned by external skills is performed before the agent is instructed to follow it exactly.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The
references/codex-tools.mdfile provides a framework for the dynamic assembly of prompts by reading template files, filling placeholders with context, and spawning new subagents using the resulting instructions.
Audit Metadata