comprehensive-review
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 22, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted content from GitHub PR descriptions and comments, which is then passed to subagents for analysis.
- Ingestion points: PR metadata is retrieved in
fetch-diff.mdand passed as a 'task description' to subagents. - Boundary markers: Limited delimiters are used in the subagent prompt in
SKILL.md, and there are no explicit warnings to ignore instructions within the description. - Capability inventory: Subagents are instructed to perform static analysis only and are forbidden from using tools.
- Sanitization: No sanitization of the PR body or comments is performed before interpolation into prompts.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes
gitandghtools for workflow automation. - Evidence:
fetch-diff.mdandscripts/post_review.jsexecute CLI commands. - Security:
post_review.jsredacts sensitive data like authentication tokens from its output and validates command-line arguments to prevent injection.
Audit Metadata