anibon-local-transcription
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 15, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Several scripts, including
benchmark_check.py,detect_hallucinations.py, andytdlp.py, usesubprocess.runto execute external tools likeyt-dlpandwhisper-cli. These commands take parameters like URLs and file paths that, if maliciously crafted, could lead to command injection or unintended system operations. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The
detect_hallucinations.pyscript computes a path to an external script in the user's home directory (~/.agents/skills/whisper-corruption-recovery/scripts/fix_hallucinations.py) and executes it using the current Python interpreter. This cross-skill execution from a computed path increases the risk of executing untrusted code if the target directory is compromised. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The
scripts/anibon/markdown.pyfile uses the__import__function to dynamically load thesysmodule. While used here for logging, this technique is a common indicator of attempts to obscure dependencies or bypass static analysis. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted transcript data from YouTube and classifies it using a list of keywords in
analyzer.py. This classification includes highly sensitive political terms, creating a vulnerability where an attacker could influence the agent's context or behavior by including specific triggers in a video's audio or captions (Mandatory Evidence: Ingestion inytdlp.py, no boundary markers, capability for subprocess execution indetect_hallucinations.py, no sanitization). - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The
SKILL.mdfile contains hardcoded Windows paths (e.g.,C:\Users\peter\...) that expose specific local usernames and system directory structures.
Audit Metadata