antigravity-vision-proxy

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 31, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The instructions in SKILL.md explicitly direct the agent to include the --dangerously-skip-permissions flag when invoking the agy vision tool, which is a deliberate bypass of built-in security checks.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes shell commands via the subprocess module in scripts/_vision.py and scripts/anibon/ytdlp.py to call yt-dlp and ffmpeg. These calls process external URLs, potentially leading to command injection.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests automated transcripts from external videos to trigger analysis. The lack of sanitization for this untrusted data creates a surface where instructions embedded in video content could influence the agent.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The library file scripts/anibon/markdown.py uses __import__ for dynamic module loading, and SKILL.md provides complex code snippets for the agent to execute at runtime for media extraction.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Aug 31, 2026, 01:20 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — antigravity-vision-proxy