antigravity-vision-proxy
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes external CLI tools including
yt-dlp,ffmpeg, andagyusing the Pythonsubprocessmodule. These calls are used to download video data, extract frames, and perform vision-based analysis, which are core components of the skill's functionality. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted transcript data fetched from YouTube videos.
- Ingestion points: Transcripts are downloaded into the workspace as
raw_transcript.jsonbyscripts/anibon/ytdlp.pyand then loaded for keyword scanning inscripts/_vision.py. - Boundary markers: The skill lacks explicit boundary markers or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the processed transcript text during its scanning and annotation phases.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses file-write capabilities (extracted frames and updated metadata files) and command execution capabilities (
ffmpeg,yt-dlp,agy). - Sanitization: While the skill includes utilities for cleaning garbled ASR text in
scripts/anibon/cleaner.py, it does not perform sanitization for potential prompt injection instructions embedded in transcripts. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches media content and metadata from YouTube. As YouTube is a well-known service, these downloads are documented as intended functionality.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill uses a dynamic import of the
sysmodule inscripts/anibon/markdown.pyto facilitate writing to the standard error stream. This is a common and benign implementation for localized logging purposes.
Audit Metadata