whisper-corruption-recovery
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes transcription data that may originate from untrusted audio sources. This data is then formatted into a Markdown report and passed to a vision model (Gemini) for analysis. This workflow is susceptible to indirect prompt injection where instructions hidden in the audio or transcript could influence the AI's behavior or final output.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads transcription data from JSON files provided by the user in
scripts/fix_hallucinations.pyandscripts/enrich_uncertain_with_vision.py. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit instructions or delimiters used to separate the untrusted transcription text from the agent's instructions when performing vision-based review in the documented workflow.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses the capability to execute shell commands (
ffmpeg,whisper-cli) and write files to the local filesystem (extracted frames and reports). - Sanitization: The
enrich_uncertain_with_vision.pyscript performs minimal escaping of special characters (only the pipe|character) when embedding the transcript text into the generated Markdown report. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill's scripts execute external binaries to process audio and video data.
- Evidence:
subprocess.runis used inscripts/fix_hallucinations.pyandscripts/enrich_uncertain_with_vision.pyto callffmpegandwhisper-cli. While the use of list-based arguments prevents typical shell injection attacks, the skill depends on the presence and integrity of these local binaries.
Audit Metadata