zoe-project-setup
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 6, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it reads and processes untrusted data from idea descriptions and message threads using the
probetool. Malicious instructions embedded in these external sources could attempt to influence the agent's behavior during the project setup process.\n - Ingestion points: External data enters the agent context via
probe idea getandprobe message list(SKILL.md).\n - Boundary markers: Absent. The skill does not use specific delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the ingested data.\n
- Capability inventory: The skill has significant capabilities, including
gh repo create,gh apifor branch protection,git push, andprobe project create(SKILL.md).\n - Sanitization: Present. The skill instructs the agent to verify that the sender of a message matches the original idea author before acting on retraction signals, providing a check against unauthorized command triggers.
Audit Metadata