story-cover
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 24, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes shell scripts to perform image generation and processing tasks. These scripts invoke system utilities including
curl,jq,base64, and image tools likemagick,convert, orsips. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill contains a potential data exfiltration vector via the
REF_IMAGEparameter. If a user or an external prompt provides a path to a sensitive local file (e.g., SSH keys or configuration files) as the reference image, the script will read that file and upload it to the remote API endpoint specified in the configuration. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill is designed to download external content by fetching images from arbitrary URLs provided in the
REF_IMAGEvariable usingcurl. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill manages a sensitive
GPT_IMAGE_API_KEYwhich is transmitted to a network endpoint defined byGPT_IMAGE_BASE_URL. While this is functional for its purpose, a malicious or accidental misconfiguration of the base URL could lead to the exfiltration of the API key to an unauthorized server. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data such as book titles and synopses, which are directly interpolated into prompts for image generation tools.
- Ingestion points: User-provided book titles, author names, and synopses in
SKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The skill lacks explicit boundary markers or "ignore embedded instructions" warnings when constructing prompts with user-supplied data.
- Capability inventory: Network access via
curl, local file read/write, and execution of shell commands and image processing binaries. - Sanitization: The skill utilizes
jqto build JSON payloads, which provides protection against shell injection in the API data, but it does not sanitize the natural language content used in the image generation prompts.
Audit Metadata