story-short-scan
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 10, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
scripts/cdp-utils.jsfile utilizeschild_process.execFileSyncto invoke theagent-browserCLI tool. The skill also orchestrates the execution of several local Node.js scripts (aggregate-rank.js,dz-browse-scraper.js,heiyan-booklist-scraper.js) via the agent to process data. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The script
scripts/heiyan-booklist-scraper.jsprogrammatically reads theAdmin-Tokenfromdocument.cookiewhen the user is logged into the management platform. While intended to facilitate API-based scraping of the user's own data, this pattern accesses and exposes active session credentials to the agent's context. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has a significant attack surface for indirect prompt injection. It scrapes untrusted data (book titles, tags, and descriptions) from platforms like
ishugui.comandmanage.zhangwenpindu.cn. This data is then aggregated and analyzed by the LLM without explicit sanitization or instruction-filtering boundaries, potentially allowing malicious content on those platforms to influence the agent's behavior. - Ingestion points:
dz-browse-scraper.jsandheiyan-booklist-scraper.jsfetch live web content. - Boundary markers: None. The scraped text is interpolated directly into the analysis workflow.
- Capability inventory: The skill can write files via
fs.writeFileSyncand execute shell commands viachild_process. - Sanitization: None detected for the scraped string content.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The
scripts/cdp-utils.jsscript contains logic inresolveWindowsAgentBrowserto dynamically locate and parse theagent-browser.cmdshim from the systemPATHto determine the executable path at runtime. Furthermore, the skill uses theevalcommand to execute dynamically constructed JavaScript strings within the browser session.
Audit Metadata