browser-cdp
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 7, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill contains explicit instructions to extract sensitive session data from the browser.
- Evidence:
agent-browser --cdp 9222 eval 'localStorage.getItem("token") || document.cookie'inSKILL.md. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The ability to programmatically extract authentication tokens and cookies provides a direct path for session hijacking if the agent is directed to send this data to an external endpoint.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes shell commands to manage browser processes, including termination of existing instances.
- Evidence: Instructions for
kill -9 {PID}andtaskkill /F /PID {PID}. - Evidence: Execution of setup scripts
node {SKILL_DIR}/scripts/setup-cdp-chrome.js. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill requires the installation of an external global NPM package.
- Evidence:
npm install -g agent-browserdocumented as a prerequisite. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill heavily relies on the
evalcommand to execute arbitrary JavaScript within the browser context. - Evidence: Multiple examples of
agent-browser --cdp 9222 evalwith both plain text and Base64 encoded payloads. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill creates a significant attack surface by ingesting untrusted web content and providing powerful tools to interact with it.
- Ingestion points:
agent-browser open "<URL>"(SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: None; the skill does not define delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands in the pages it visits.
- Capability inventory: Arbitrary JS execution (
eval), process termination (kill), and session data access (cookie/localStorage). - Sanitization: None; data retrieved from the browser (e.g.,
document.body.innerText) is passed directly to the agent without escaping.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata