video-assemble
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 7, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]:
- Ingestion points: Data is processed from external files such as
tts_meta.json,original_subtitles.json,visual_overlays.json, and user-provided subtitle files (JSON/SRT/ASS) inscripts/assemble.pyandscripts/source_subtitles.py. - Boundary markers: Absent; the skill does not use explicit delimiters to separate untrusted data content from system instructions.
- Capability inventory: System-level capabilities include complex audio/video manipulation and file generation via
subprocess.runcalls toffmpegandffprobe, primarily wrapped inscripts/lib.pyandscripts/adoption/strict_inputs.py. - Sanitization: The skill implements schema validation for JSON inputs and strict numeric range checking for parameters in
scripts/adoption/strict_inputs.py. It also provides an escaping utility fordrawtextfilter text inscripts/visual_render.pyto mitigate filter injection, although text content is otherwise largely preserved for final outputs. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]:
- The skill relies on system commands to perform its core media processing functions.
- Evidence: Found in
scripts/lib.py(run_cmd),scripts/adoption/strict_inputs.py(run_logged), and across specialized modules likescripts/compose_foreground.pyandscripts/source_score.pywhich build command lists for FFmpeg execution based on input metadata.
Audit Metadata