video-voiceover

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 25, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes extensive use of the subprocess module to call ffmpeg and ffprobe for media processing tasks such as audio extraction, duration calculation, and video muxing.
  • Evidence: Found in scripts/lib.py (function run_cmd), scripts/dub.py (_ffmpeg_extract_wav, _cut_wav, _time_fit, _mux), and scripts/voiceover.py (_prepare_voice_reference).
  • Note: While the use of list-based arguments mitigates shell injection risks, the ability to execute shell-level commands remains a significant capability.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it processes text from external JSON files and interpolates it into payloads sent to remote synthesis and recognition services.
  • Ingestion points: The skill reads from narration.json (in voiceover.py) and dub_script.json (in dub.py).
  • Boundary markers: No explicit boundary markers or "ignore" instructions are used to wrap the untrusted text before it is sent to the TTS/ASR APIs.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses network access (API calls to MiMo and Fish Audio), file system write access (saving audio segments), and shell execution capabilities (ffmpeg).
  • Sanitization: A _clean_narration_text function in voiceover.py removes markdown formatting, emojis, and specific annotations, but it is not designed to detect or sanitize adversarial prompt instructions.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Aug 25, 2026, 08:52 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — video-voiceover