video-transcript

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 22, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMPROMPT_INJECTIONPERSISTENCEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill includes instructions in references/auth-setup.md that explicitly direct the agent to circumvent platform-level security redaction. It advises the agent to write sensitive information, such as access_token and api_key values, to temporary files specifically to prevent them from being detected or redacted by tool-output security filters.
  • [PERSISTENCE]: The instructions in references/auth-setup.md guide the agent to persistently store credentials by modifying shell configuration files like ~/.bashrc and ~/.zshrc. This allows the skill's environment variables and potential modifications to survive across different shell sessions.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external content (YouTube transcripts) which presents an attack surface where malicious instructions could be embedded in video captions to influence the agent's behavior.
  • Ingestion points: Transcripts are fetched from the external transcriptapi.com service as defined in SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: There are no instructions to use delimiters or ignore instructions that might be contained within the transcript data.
  • Capability inventory: The agent is granted capabilities for network access (HTTP GET/POST) and file system modification (writing to profile and temporary files).
  • Sanitization: The skill does not implement or recommend any sanitization, validation, or filtering of the transcript content before it is analyzed or summarized by the agent.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Sep 22, 2026, 09:10 PM