video-transcript
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 22, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMPROMPT_INJECTIONPERSISTENCEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill includes instructions in
references/auth-setup.mdthat explicitly direct the agent to circumvent platform-level security redaction. It advises the agent to write sensitive information, such asaccess_tokenandapi_keyvalues, to temporary files specifically to prevent them from being detected or redacted by tool-output security filters. - [PERSISTENCE]: The instructions in
references/auth-setup.mdguide the agent to persistently store credentials by modifying shell configuration files like~/.bashrcand~/.zshrc. This allows the skill's environment variables and potential modifications to survive across different shell sessions. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external content (YouTube transcripts) which presents an attack surface where malicious instructions could be embedded in video captions to influence the agent's behavior.
- Ingestion points: Transcripts are fetched from the external
transcriptapi.comservice as defined inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: There are no instructions to use delimiters or ignore instructions that might be contained within the transcript data.
- Capability inventory: The agent is granted capabilities for network access (HTTP GET/POST) and file system modification (writing to profile and temporary files).
- Sanitization: The skill does not implement or recommend any sanitization, validation, or filtering of the transcript content before it is analyzed or summarized by the agent.
Audit Metadata