pi-delegate
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill operates by delegating tasks to local workers via the
pi_spawn,pi_steer, andpi_continuetools. The primary ingestion point for untrusted data is thetaskparameter in these tool calls. While the instructions (SKILL.md) mandate supervisor oversight and objective boundary definition, there is a risk that malicious user-supplied instructions could be interpolated into these tasks, potentially misleading the worker into performing unauthorized actions. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: According to the documentation in
references/mcp-contract.md, theimplementworker profile provides access tobashfor running tests, builds, and shell-based verification. Although the skill instructions emphasize that the supervisor must retain all risk decisions and verify results, this capability represents a significant attack surface if the agent is influenced by malicious task instructions. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The reference material (
references/mcp-contract.md) describes how to install the@zguiyang/pi-task-execpackage from a public registry. This resource is owned by the skill's author (zguiyang) and represents expected functionality for this skill's ecosystem. The skill explicitly instructs the agent not to auto-install the package or run the launch command directly, which is a positive safety constraint.
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