baoyu-slide-deck
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 16, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill contains instructions that direct the AI model to bypass certain refusal behaviors. Specifically, the
references/base-prompt.mdfile instructs the agent to create "stylistically similar alternatives" for sensitive or copyrighted figures rather than refusing to generate them. Additionally, the skill processes untrusted user-provided content and interpolates it into prompts for an external image generation tool, presenting a surface for indirect prompt injection.\n - Ingestion points: User-provided text is saved to
source.mdand read by the agent to generate slide outlines and prompts.\n - Boundary markers: The skill uses structured templates with specific tags like
STYLE_INSTRUCTIONSandSLIDE CONTENTto separate system instructions from user content.\n - Capability inventory: The agent can write to the local file system, execute scripts via
npx, and trigger external image generation skills.\n - Sanitization: No explicit content sanitization or safety filtering of the input text is documented before it is used to generate prompts.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes local TypeScript scripts (
scripts/merge-to-pptx.ts,scripts/merge-to-pdf.ts) using thenpx -y buncommand to assemble slide images into PDF and PowerPoint files. It also utilizes basic shell commands for file system operations such as checking for configuration files and managing output directories.\n- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill depends on third-party Node.js packages, specificallypdf-libandpptxgenjs, which are used by the merging scripts to generate documents. These are well-established libraries in the technology ecosystem.
Audit Metadata