env-scan-ontology
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 18, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFE
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process metadata from external databases and API definitions, which constitutes an attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Metadata is retrieved from database
information_schema(tables, columns, types, comments) and OpenAPI/MCP tool definitions as described inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit instructions or delimiters defined to isolate ingested metadata from the agent's core instructions, making it possible for malicious schema comments to influence agent behavior.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes shell command execution (via Python scripts) and local file system operations (reading/writing to the
.livepowers/directory). - Sanitization: While the skill claims to skip sensitive data fields (e.g., passwords, SSNs), it does not specify sanitization for the metadata strings themselves, which are the primary injection vector.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions direct the agent to execute Python scripts located within the plugin directory (
scan_sqlite.py,scan_sql.py). These scripts perform file system writes and network-based database queries. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The documentation provides examples of database connection strings (DSN) that include plain-text credentials (e.g.,
postgres://user:pass@host:5432/db). While used as a template, this encourages the insecure practice of passing secrets as command-line arguments, which can be logged in shell history or visible in process monitors.
Audit Metadata