skills/zhanziyang/skills/copywriting/Gen Agent Trust Hub

copywriting

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 29, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions in references/gemini-first.md direct the agent to execute a shell command (gemini-cli) via a login shell (zsh) while passing user-supplied requests and source materials "as-is". This creates a potential command injection vector if the agent does not properly escape shell metacharacters within the user input.
  • Evidence: In references/gemini-first.md: "Run Gemini through an explicit login zsh... Forward the user's original request and supplied source material as-is."
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external data (user requests and source materials) and forwards them to an external LLM via the gemini-cli without using boundary markers or sanitization to prevent the external model from following malicious instructions embedded in that data.
  • Ingestion points: User requests and source material processed in SKILL.md and references/gemini-first.md.
  • Boundary markers: Absent. The skill explicitly forbids adding personas or schemas to the forwarded content.
  • Capability inventory: Shell command execution via gemini-cli as described in references/gemini-first.md.
  • Sanitization: Absent. No instructions for escaping, filtering, or validating the input before transmission.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Aug 29, 2026, 03:09 PM