code-reviewer
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 16, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is inherently designed to ingest untrusted data from external sources (pull requests and code changes), creating a vulnerability surface where malicious instructions embedded in a diff could influence the agent behavior.
- Ingestion points: The 'Context Gathering' phase in
SKILL.mdinstructs the agent to rungit diffandgit log, and read relevant project documentation, pulling external code directly into the active context. - Boundary markers: Absent. The instructions do not specify the use of delimiters or 'ignore instructions within data' directives when processing the code diffs.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to powerful tools including
Bash,WebFetch, andWebSearch(as listed inSKILL.mdfrontmatter), which could be targeted by an injection attack to perform unauthorized actions. - Sanitization: Absent. The
scripts/review_checklist.pyscript includes a diff preview in its output without escaping or sanitizing the content, though it does truncate the output to 100 lines. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on shell command execution to function.
- Evidence:
SKILL.mdprovidesgitcommands for the agent to execute in its environment. - Evidence:
scripts/review_checklist.pyusessubprocess.run()to executegit diffandgit log. While it uses a list for arguments (preventing simple shell injection), it represents a functional capability for local system interaction.
Audit Metadata