docx
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 11, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: Runtime C compilation detected in
scripts/office/soffice.py. The script writes a C source string (_SHIM_SOURCE) to/tmp/lo_socket_shim.cand compiles it usinggccinto a shared object file (lo_socket_shim.so) to intercept system calls. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: Process injection via
LD_PRELOAD. The filescripts/office/soffice.pyconfigures the execution environment for LibreOffice to load the runtime-compiled library, allowing it to hook core socket functions (socket, listen, accept, close) to bypass sandboxing constraints on Unix domain sockets. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: Dynamic macro injection in
scripts/accept_changes.py. The skill generates a StarBasic macro XML file at runtime to automate the acceptance of tracked changes within LibreOffice. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Subprocess execution of system binaries. The skill uses
subprocess.runto invokegcc,soffice,git,pandoc, and tools from thePopplersuite (pdftoppm). While arguments are generally handled via list formatting to prevent shell injection, the breadth of binary execution increases the risk profile. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: Attack surface for document ingestion. The skill reads and processes untrusted
.docxand.docfiles viascripts/office/unpack.pyandscripts/accept_changes.py. Although it mitigates XML-based attacks (XXE) by using thedefusedxmllibrary, the extracted text content is ultimately provided to the AI agent's context without formal sanitization of potential embedded instructions.
Audit Metadata