feishu-doc
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 11, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFE
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill fetches content from external Feishu entities (Docs, Wiki, Sheets, Bitable) and returns it to the agent, creating a surface for instructions embedded in those documents to influence agent behavior.
- Ingestion points:
readDocinindex.js,fetchDocxContentinlib/docx.js,fetchBitableContentinlib/bitable.js, andfetchSheetContentinlib/sheet.js. - Boundary markers: Absent. Fetched content is converted to Markdown and returned without explicit delimiters or warnings to the agent regarding third-party content.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses significant capabilities including overwriting documents (
writeDoc), appending content (appendDoc), and granting edit permissions to other users (grantPermissionincreate.js). - Sanitization: Sanitization logic in
input_guard.jsis focused on preventing API errors during write operations and does not sanitize incoming data for prompt injection patterns. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: Utility scripts designed for setup and inspection contain hardcoded resource identifiers.
- Evidence:
inspect_meta.jsandsetup_iter11.jscontain hardcoded app tokens (X8QPbUQdValKN7sFIwfcsy8fnEh,LvlAbvfzMaxUP8sGOEWcLrX7nHb) and table IDs. While these are identifiers rather than secrets likeapp_secret, hardcoding specific target resources in the skill distribution is a minor data exposure risk.
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