pentest-tools
Audited by Socket on Jul 30, 2026
47 alerts found:
Malwarex27Anomalyx4Securityx16该片段不是软件依赖代码,而是面向攻击者的“可执行命令/攻击链条”材料,包含凭证窃取(Mimikatz/LSASS/缓存/SECURITY hive导出)、横向移动与远程执行(PsExec/WMI/WinRM/计划任务/服务)、域提权与持久化(注册表/WMI/任务/后门用户/Skeleton Key/DSRM/SID History)、以及免杀与EDR绕过(AMSI/ETW patch、API unhooking、BlockDLLs、注入/镂空、shellcode加密)。这类内容即使不直接作为代码执行,也属于高度恶意用途的公开武器化指引材料;若出现在公共包/仓库中,供应链安全风险很高。
The provided fragment does not show executable dependency code; it appears to be an attacker-focused instructional cheat-sheet containing detailed, defensive-evasion-oriented exploit payload examples. No direct evidence of runtime supply-chain malware (data theft, network exfiltration, backdoors, or install-time execution) can be established from this excerpt alone. However, the content is highly actionable and would materially increase offensive capability if distributed as part of a package or repository artifact. Additional files (actual package entry points, install/postinstall scripts, bundled binaries, or CI/workflow content) are required to determine whether any real malicious behavior exists beyond this text.
该“source code”片段更像是跨平台的漏洞利用/武器化说明与PoC载荷集合,明确指向RCE(命令执行)、不安全反序列化/JNDI类加载触发、以及写入/部署Webshell等持久化手段,并包含外带回调与WAF/EDR绕过要点。若这类内容出现在公开依赖包中,属于严重安全红旗;需要人工复核其在包内的实际位置与是否存在自动执行(如脚本、编译期生成、postinstall触发等)。
This fragment is overwhelmingly consistent with malicious exploitation/playbook instructions: it demonstrates Kubernetes ServiceAccount token abuse to enumerate permissions, list Secrets, and create a privileged host-mounted Pod (escape/cluster takeover). It also provides detailed offensive guidance for cache poisoning/deception, CDN/WAF bypass concepts, and SSRF bypass chains that can enable internal access and data theft. Treat as severe supply-chain compromise content if present in a dependency; remove/quarantine and perform incident response. Confidence is reduced only because the exact surrounding module/package code is not provided.
This fragment is highly suspicious because it includes explicit malicious payload patterns (remote download-and-execute via curl|bash and shell=True), SSRF targeting cloud metadata/local/admin/internal services, and descriptions of privilege escalation/destructive actions and secret exfiltration. However, the actual dependency/module implementation is not provided in full, so malware cannot be conclusively confirmed as being executed by the package itself. Treat the dependency as high-risk until the real source, entrypoints, post-install scripts, and tool/plugin execution pathways are independently verified and sandbox-tested.
The provided content is not a benign dependency implementation; it is an attacker-oriented exploitation playbook covering multiple high-impact file-related web compromise techniques (upload bypass to webshell/RCE, arbitrary file download/traversal/LFI secret exfiltration, Zip Slip arbitrary write, and race-condition exploitation). If such material appears within a distributed software package/repository, it represents a high misuse and potential malicious-payload distribution risk. Insufficient context exists to confirm whether any installer/runtime behavior exists in this module, but the operational and weaponized nature of the content warrants treating the artifact as highly suspicious and high security risk.
The provided fragment is highly consistent with a malicious exploitation playbook (not legitimate dependency source code). It details how to bypass file upload restrictions, deploy webshells for command execution, read sensitive files via traversal/LFI, and perform arbitrary file write via Zip Slip. If this material appears within an actual open-source dependency package, it represents an extremely high security risk and should be treated as malicious/weaponized content pending thorough inspection of the surrounding files (e.g., scripts, installation hooks, and runtime entry points).
SUSPICIOUS。该 skill 的能力范围与“渗透测试工具链”描述一致,但其本质是为 AI agent 提供高风险攻击与利用能力;再叠加第三方 Docker/MCP 依赖、发布源不一致和自主循环执行,使整体安全风险很高。
This fragment contains highly weaponizable XSS attack content: payloads for cookie theft and keylogging/credential exfiltration, plus BeEF hook/C2 enablement and multiple WAF/EDR bypass encodings (including eval/atob-style dynamic execution examples). No benign library functionality is evidenced. While the excerpt does not prove the dependency executes this content, shipping it in a package (especially as executable code or embedded resources) would constitute an extreme supply-chain security concern requiring immediate containment and deeper inspection of the actual package files and execution paths.
This fragment is not application/library code; it is an exploit guidance/write-up showing how to abuse PHP LFI vulnerabilities and stream wrappers (php://, data://, zip://, phar://) to read sensitive files, execute PHP, trigger phar deserialization RCE, and even obtain reverse shells. If this content exists within a published package, it indicates malicious intent or at least facilitation of attacks, creating a high security risk for anyone using the package blindly.
The provided fragment contains no executable logic; it is an offensive SSRF bypass and escalation playbook with highly actionable payloads targeting internal loopback addresses and follow-on compromise of Redis/MySQL (webshell/SSH/cron/INTO OUTFILE). While this specific content fragment does not prove runtime malware, its nature is strongly malicious/weaponized and would represent a serious security and supply-chain risk if included in a distributed software package.
This fragment is an adversarial machine-learning patch generator that optimizes a targeted perturbation to force a vision model toward a specified class and then saves an artifact for later deployment. It does not show classic malware indicators (no network/exfiltration, no credential theft, no process execution) in the provided code, but it is strongly abuse-capable and could enable targeted evasion/misdirection of deployed image classification systems. Treat as high-risk for misuse in security-sensitive contexts; further review of the full package is needed to confirm absence of additional harmful behaviors.
This module is an explicit cloud intrusion playbook rather than legitimate library code. It provides operational steps to steal cloud credentials from instance metadata via SSRF, exfiltrate/harvest sensitive data from S3 and secret stores, escalate privileges through AWS IAM, and achieve container/host escape in Kubernetes using privileged pods and ServiceAccount tokens. No obfuscation is present; the maliciousness is overt. Treat any packaging/integration of this content as a critical security incident and do not include it in trusted software artifacts.
This fragment is highly suspicious and security-relevant: it provides an exploitation/PoC-oriented workflow for WebSocket/H2C request smuggling and reverse-proxy differential exploitation, plus tests for WebSocket auth/session weaknesses and unauthorized channel subscription (IDOR/vertical bypass). While it does not clearly show classic backdoor or data-stealing malware logic, it is designed for scanning internal ports via tunneling and bypassing access controls, making it inappropriate for inclusion in a benign dependency. Treat as malicious or at minimum as an exploit-testing artifact requiring removal and provenance verification.
This fragment is an actionable credential-theft and domain-compromise playbook. It explicitly describes how to extract sensitive secrets from multiple Windows credential stores, deployment remnants (Unattend/Sysprep), WiFi configurations, and KeePass, then leverage those secrets/hashes/ticket artifacts for lateral movement and persistence (DCSync, golden/silver ticket injection). It also includes a remote download-and-execute (IEX) staging pattern and references monitoring-evasion techniques. Even though no functional dependency source code is provided here, the content is highly suspicious and would pose a severe security risk if distributed as part of an open-source package or supply-chain artifact.
The provided fragment is offensive request-smuggling exploitation content. It crafts raw HTTP/1.1 requests with conflicting Transfer-Encoding and Content-Length semantics, uses malformed/ambiguous Transfer-Encoding variants to trigger parsing differentials between proxy and backend, embeds a second HTTP request inside the first, and sends the result over a TCP socket to induce desynchronization. This can plausibly enable ACL/WAF bypass, request hijacking, and potential cache poisoning. No classic malware behaviors (persistence/backdoor/exfiltration) are shown in the fragment, but its intent and actionable exploit nature make it a high security risk if found in a software supply chain artifact.
This fragment is overwhelmingly indicative of malicious/offensive capability: it is an HTTP request smuggling payload corpus with step-by-step attack chains, bypass/evasion variants, and proof-of-concept socket code for sending crafted desynchronizing HTTP messages. While it does not show post-exploitation credential theft or malware persistence within this snippet, its presence in a dependency would materially increase an attacker’s ability to compromise web infrastructure (e.g., ACL bypass, request hijacking, cache poisoning).
该 skill 与其宣称目的基本一致,但其目的本身是为 AI 代理提供真实环境漏洞挖掘与利用能力,范围覆盖主动探测、绕过、默认凭据、移动端和后渗透,风险很高。未见明确凭据外传或恶意伪装证据,因此更接近高风险 offensive skill,而非确认恶意软件。
This fragment is best characterized as CSRF/CORS/Origin/Referer/SameSite bypass exploitation guidance with example authenticated cross-site request code (`fetch` + `credentials: "include"`) and described exfiltration patterns. It contains strong offensive signals, but the provided content does not demonstrate executable malware within a dependency module (no obfuscation, no persistence, no runtime backdoor mechanisms shown). Treat as suspicious/high misuse risk for a supply-chain context, and verify the actual package contents for any executable behavior beyond instructional material.
This fragment is an offensive web-attack playbook (cache poisoning, cache deception for sensitive content caching, and CDN/origin bypass) with explicit step-by-step request crafting and injection payload examples. No executable dependency code is present in the excerpt, so classical malware/persistence cannot be confirmed. Nevertheless, the content is strongly aligned with facilitating real-world compromise via caching/CDN misconfiguration and security boundary bypass, making it a high security-risk artifact if included in a software supply chain.
High malicious-use risk content rather than a legitimate dependency: it provides actionable reconnaissance and exploitation instructions to extract source code/configuration/secrets from exposed endpoints (e.g., .git/.env/debug/Swagger) and then pivot to DB/API/cloud and account takeover. No obfuscation is observed. Because this is not actual package code, code-supply-chain malware cannot be confirmed, but the fragment is clearly designed to facilitate unauthorized access and credential theft.
This fragment is highly suspicious offensive material rather than legitimate dependency code. It provides explicit, actionable instructions for Windows SYSTEM escalation (Potato family variants) and Linux root escalation patterns (SUID/sudo/cron/kernel), including reverse-shell establishment, remote payload download/execution via PowerShell IEX, administrative account creation, and EDR-evasion tactics. If present in a software supply-chain artifact, it represents an extreme security risk and a strong indicator of malware/backdoor enabling or attacker-operational content.
This fragment is highly suspicious and effectively an offensive instruction/playbook for Windows/domain lateral movement and credential abuse (remote execution via SMB/WMI/WinRM/DCOM/scheduled tasks, and authentication attacks via NTLM relay, Pass-the-Hash/Overpass-the-Hash, and Pass-the-Ticket). It contains no obfuscation, and it provides directly actionable steps and evasion hints. While runtime malware cannot be confirmed from this text-only fragment alone, its content is strongly indicative of malicious intent and represents a major supply-chain security risk if published or packaged as part of a dependency.
The provided code fragment is explicitly malicious: it collects all available environment variables (likely including CI/CD secrets) and exfiltrates them to a hardcoded attacker-controlled endpoint using urllib.request.urlopen with the secrets embedded in the HTTP request body. Even with limited surrounding context, the presence of a direct source-to-sink exfiltration flow warrants treating this dependency/package fragment as a high-risk supply-chain compromise indicator.
The provided fragment is an operator-oriented offensive playbook for AD reconnaissance and multiple credential-access/escalation paths (SharpHound/BloodHound, Rubeus Kerberos roasting/PTT and S4U, certipy AD CS exploitation and shadow credentials, LaZagne password recovery, Seatbelt/PEAS enumeration), including a high-risk remote execution pattern (`curl ... | bash`) and intentional generation/storage of sensitive artifacts. If this capability were embedded into a software dependency’s install or runtime behavior, it would represent an extremely serious supply-chain security risk, though execution context cannot be verified from the snippet alone.
This “source code” fragment is best characterized as an offensive JWT exploitation guide rather than benign library functionality. It provides highly actionable steps and snippets for forging JWTs via algorithm/key confusion, brute-forcing weak HMAC secrets, and abusing jku/x5u header trust to inject attacker-controlled JWKS keys. No direct malware execution or stealth behavior is visible in the fragment itself, but if such content is included in a dependency, it represents a significant misuse/security enablement risk. Higher confidence requires access to the actual package’s executable module code and install/runtime hooks to confirm whether anything is executed beyond documentation-like text.
The provided fragment is not an analyzable dependency code module; it is a highly actionable exploitation/persistence and secret-theft runbook. It contains concrete payloads and end-to-end attack workflows (admin/auth bypass probing, Actuator heapdump/env credential extraction, Redis file-write persistence/webshell/cron reverse shell, and app-server deserialization/RCE patterns). No obfuscation is present. While the fragment alone does not prove the dependency executes malicious code, its inclusion in a distributed package would be a severe supply-chain risk because it equips attackers with direct compromise steps. More evidence would be required to determine whether any actual npm package code runs these behaviors.
This file is not legitimate dependency source code; it is an attacker-oriented Active Directory intrusion and privilege-escalation playbook containing explicit, operational commands for credential theft, Kerberos/ticket manipulation, ADCS abuse, DCShadow/domain replication injection, RCE-style payload triggering, and persistence via Group Policy/Run keys. If such content appears in a software supply chain artifact (e.g., package repository, dependency, published asset), it represents a severe security risk due to direct weaponization potential. No meaningful obfuscation is present; the malicious intent is evident from the guidance and effects described.
This fragment is highly indicative of malicious client-side attack code. It explicitly performs cookie theft (document.cookie) and exfiltration to an attacker-controlled domain via a redirect (document.location to https://evil.com/steal?c=...). It also includes multiple iframe-centric defense-evasion variants (data:/blob:/srcdoc, sandbox weakening/escape patterns) and interaction-based delivery (clickjacking/social engineering and drag-and-drop/event-handler triggers). It should be treated as malware/exploit content and not used in any dependency or delivered to users.
该片段不是可审计的 npm/依赖库代码,而是对多种网络认证暴力破解工具与字典的直接操作说明(medusa/ncrack/crowbar/patator、以及 CrackStation 在线查询与 hashcat/john/hydra 配合)。其输入(目标/用户名/密码字典/私钥/哈希)会流向远程认证尝试与第三方在线查询,具有明显的进攻与凭据获取用途,因此供应链安全视角下风险很高。
The provided fragment is not dependency code and therefore cannot be reviewed for classic supply-chain malware behaviors at the function/module level. However, the content is a highly actionable offensive security playbook targeting banking/payment/APP authentication and exploitation workflows. If this text appears inside a published package intended for general use, it is a significant supply-chain trust and misuse red flag. Based solely on this snippet, there is no evidence of embedded executable malware (no runtime sinks, secrets, or obfuscated payloads), but the document’s intent and operational nature warrant rejection/containment and investigation of the surrounding repository/package contents.
No evidence of embedded malware/backdoor behavior is present in the snippet itself (it contains no obfuscated payloads, no persistence, and no credential theft/exfiltration code). However, the fragment is highly actionable offensive reconnaissance and fuzzing guidance: it includes product fingerprinting indicators, large lists of high-risk endpoint paths (upload/RCE-adjacent/admin/info-disclosure), SQLi/business-logic parameter wordlists, spoofable header/cookie examples, and curl-based probing loops. This substantially increases an attacker’s capability to identify and target vulnerable enterprise systems if used without explicit authorization.
This fragment is a highly actionable offensive security playbook: it instructs how to generate and trigger RCE/reverse-shell payloads using exploitation frameworks, serialization/JNDI weaponization, and C2/post-exploitation tooling. While it is not executable code logic itself, its operational nature and explicit compromise workflows make it a strong indicator of malicious intent and a severe supply-chain risk if included in a software package.
高风险恶意内容指示:该片段提供了多种Windows/域环境持久化与后门建立的具体命令与实现思路(注册表Run/RunOnce/Winlogon、WMI订阅、启动文件夹、服务、AppInit_DLLs、隐藏/后门用户、计划任务、Skeleton Key/DSRM/SID History,以及DLL注入与进程镂空)。这类内容与真实入侵链直接对应,具备明显恶意意图与可操作性。若在软件依赖中出现并可被执行/触发,将极其危险。当前仅有文本/命令片段,缺少其是否会在安装/运行时执行的上下文,因此恶意“执行”概率略有不确定性。
该片段不是可执行库代码,而是面向入侵/横向移动的“内网穿透与隧道代理”操作指南集合(含FRP/Chisel/SSH转发/DNS/ICMP隧道/Ligolo/Ngrok/EW/Venom,以及ReGeorg通过WebShell建立SOCKS隧道的步骤)。其意图与可操作性强,显著增加被用于未授权访问与绕过防火墙的风险。由于没有实际npm依赖代码或执行逻辑,无法评估是否存在代码级供应链投毒,但内容本身具有较高的安全威胁指向。
This fragment is highly consistent with offensive host enumeration and privilege escalation guidance for both Linux and Windows, including direct attempts to read sensitive files (shadow/SSH keys/root history) and running well-known enumeration/exploit-assist tools (WinPEAS/LinPEAS and a kernel exploit suggester). As such, it presents a strong malicious/abusive intent indicator if included in a software supply-chain artifact.
This fragment is explicitly malicious/attack-focused: it contains concrete instructions and examples for reading sensitive local files, encoding them, and exfiltrating them via DNS and HTTP to attacker-controlled infrastructure, plus guidance for SSRF/path traversal/WAF and upload bypass with cloud metadata targeting. If present in a software package, it is a serious supply-chain security concern and should be treated as high-risk.
This snippet is a weaponized intrusion aid (credential dictionary + scanning/fingerprinting + brute-force workflow templates + references to escalation topics). It contains no executable supply-chain malware logic, but it is directly usable to facilitate unauthorized access attempts and subsequent exploitation. Treat as high-risk malicious material; do not include in any software supply chain distribution or repository without strict authorization and controls.
This fragment is highly consistent with malicious PowerShell attack tooling or an operator-facing command set: it provides direct remote download-and-execute (HTTP + IEX), execution-policy bypass, encoded-command execution, and an explicit AMSI bypass via reflection. It also performs recon (system/process/service/network/user) and broad sensitive document discovery across C:\, plus basic port scanning. If packaged or automated within a dependency workflow, it would present a very high security risk.
This fragment is not a software dependency implementation; it is actionable offensive guidance for ADCS exploitation using Certipy, including known certificate-template abuse paths (ESC1/ESC2), certificate-based authentication, relay abuse, and exporting PFX credential material. There is no evidence of obfuscation or embedded malware within the provided text, but the instructions strongly facilitate intrusion and privilege/impersonation against an Active Directory environment. Treat as high security risk content in any distribution or repository context.
This fragment is an explicit credential-stealing and Kerberos/DPAPI abuse playbook. It instructs execution of LSASS/SAM/LSA secret extraction (including LSASS dump creation), pass-the-hash, domain controller secret retrieval, Kerberos roasting/forging and ticket injection (/ptt), and DPAPI credential extraction across one or many targets. No benign or defensive logic is present; the actions strongly indicate malicious post-exploitation behavior.
This fragment is high-risk misuse-oriented content: it provides step-by-step instructions to establish reverse SOCKS/proxy tunnels, forward sensitive ports (including RDP/3389), and pivot into an internal subnet by adding routes, using a certificate verification bypass for the agent connection. While it is not malware code itself, it strongly enables unauthorized access and lateral movement if included in a distributable package or executed/invoked as part of an attack workflow.
No executable malware is present in this fragment; however, it is a highly actionable, weaponized AD CS exploitation playbook with explicit privilege escalation and NTLM relay steps, including evasion via certificate template modification/restoration. If this content appears inside a software dependency/package, it is a serious supply-chain red flag and should be treated as malicious instructional material enabling domain compromise rather than benign documentation.
This fragment is an explicitly offensive, actionable exploitation and recon playbook for Microsoft Exchange, describing SSRF, authentication bypass, and (as claimed in the chain) RCE exploitation paths, followed by mailbox enumeration/access and export. If this content appears in a software dependency or package artifact, it represents an extreme supply-chain abuse risk because it materially facilitates real intrusion activity. Further verification is needed to determine whether the distribution includes executable exploit scripts and whether any code triggers them automatically.
This artifact is actionable, offensive operational documentation for deploying and controlling C2/payloads and performing post-exploitation (credential dumping, token theft, lateral movement, and SOCKS pivoting). Even without embedded executable code, its direct guidance for credential/token compromise and intrusion activity makes it highly inappropriate and highly risky for a benign software supply chain dependency.
This fragment is high-risk offensive automation guidance: it specifies a loop that performs recon and vulnerability detection, then proceeds to exploit/PoC verification and evidence capture, with Burp MCP replay integration and proxy-pool-based evasion to sustain scanning. While it does not itself show embedded malicious code, distributing or embedding this workflow in a software dependency/agent framework materially increases capability for unauthorized exploitation unless strict authorization and safety guardrails are enforced externally.
该文件不是软件依赖实现代码,而是面向 SharePoint 的枚举与凭证驱动文档访问/敏感搜索的攻击指导材料。它明确给出可用于发现站点/用户/文档库、搜索敏感内容并下载/同步敏感文件的端到端路径;未观察到传统恶意软件内嵌机制(混淆、持久化、远连等),但内容本身具备显著的滥用价值与高安全风险,不应在安全合规环境中作为参考或依赖使用。