skill-creator

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 18, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The installation workflow in SKILL.md instructs the agent to fetch content from user-provided URLs and explicitly directs the agent to follow instructions in a setup file (e.g., INSTALL.md) from those sources. This creates a pattern for executing arbitrary remote code.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's primary function is to ingest and install content from external sources, which is a significant attack surface for indirect prompt injection. A malicious skill package could contain hidden instructions targeting the agent.
  • Ingestion points: The skill provides a mechanism to fetch content from URLs and archives in SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: There are no security boundary markers or instructions to disregard potential commands within the fetched content.
  • Capability inventory: The skill context includes tools for bash command execution, python script execution, and file system modifications.
  • Sanitization: The quick_validate.py script performs structural and format validation but does not analyze the logic or security of scripts within the skill.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: Through scripts/init_skill.py, the skill generates new Python files and sets file permissions to executable. This facilitates the runtime creation and preparation of executable code.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The management of skill files involves shell commands for extraction, moving directories, and packaging, which could be targeted by path traversal or command injection if inputs are maliciously crafted.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Sep 18, 2026, 03:57 AM