probe-rs

Fail

Audited by Snyk on Nov 19, 2026

Risk Level: CRITICAL
Full Analysis

CRITICAL E004: Prompt injection detected in skill instructions.

  • Potential prompt injection detected (medium risk: 0.30). The skill is a legitimate probe-rs CLI wrapper with no malicious intent, but its documented operation_mode safeguard (1/2/3, including "执行前确认" confirm-before-execute) is never implemented in the code, so a user relying on it is misled about the protection they have.

MEDIUM W011: Third-party content exposure detected (indirect prompt injection risk).

  • Third-party content exposure detected (low risk: 0.10). The RTT path (probe_rs_rtt.py streaming target log lines via emit_stream_record) is the only runtime channel carrying text from outside the user's own tooling; it is firmware output from the target device, which an outsider could influence only if the firmware echoes external input, so I'm rating it low under the recall-first override.

MEDIUM W013: Attempt to modify system services in skill instructions.

  • Attempt to modify system services in skill instructions detected (low risk: 0.30). The skill is a probe-rs debugging wrapper whose operations target the embedded board, not the host; the only host-level change it mentions is the conditional advice to switch J-Link to WinUSB, which alters driver bindings but is not an instruction to the agent to perform it.

Issues (3)

E004
CRITICAL

Prompt injection detected in skill instructions.

W011
MEDIUM

Third-party content exposure detected (indirect prompt injection risk).

W013
MEDIUM

Attempt to modify system services in skill instructions.

Audit Metadata
Risk Level
CRITICAL
Analyzed
Nov 19, 2026, 09:03 AM
Issues
3