memory-to-skill
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 18, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from historical session transcripts and journals (
.memsearch/memory/*.md). If these records contain malicious instructions from previous sessions, they could influence the agent during the distillation process. - Ingestion points: Reads journal files in
.memsearch/memory/and transcript files viamemsearch transcript <file>. - Boundary markers: No specific delimiters are defined for the content being read, though instructions advise the agent to be exact and look for recurring procedures.
- Capability inventory: Uses the
Bashtool to executememsearchcommands and write files. - Sanitization: Instructions explicitly warn to exclude secrets and verify details against original transcripts.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill dynamically generates new executable content (AI agent skills) by drafting markdown steps and persisting them to the file system.
- Evidence: The skill uses
printfandmemsearch skills addto create newSKILL.mdfiles based on interpreted session history. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies heavily on the
Bashtool to interact with the localmemsearchCLI, managing configuration, listing candidates, and installing files to sensitive directories like.claude/skillsand~/.claude/skills.
Audit Metadata