report
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 17, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill accepts user-supplied arguments (
--format,--audience,--sections) and interpolates them directly into the system prompt for a spawned subagent. While the skill attempts to sanitize this input by truncating it to 200 characters and stripping backticks and angle brackets, this does not prevent an attacker from providing natural language instructions designed to override the subagent's behavior. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes the
Bashtool to resolve directory paths via ajqcommand. The implementation correctly uses the--argflag to pass variables tojq, which prevents shell injection from the$TOPIC_SLUGvariable. However, it remains a point where file system metadata and external JSON data influence command-line execution parameters. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill presents an indirect prompt injection surface by ingesting data from research state files (
state.json) and using it to drive orchestration and subagent parameters. - Ingestion points: The skill reads the
topic_slugfrom./reports/*/state.jsonand parses user input from$ARGUMENTS. - Boundary markers: The subagent prompt in Phase 1 lacks explicit delimiters (e.g., XML tags or triple quotes with 'ignore' instructions) to isolate the untrusted parameters from the agent's core instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to powerful tools including
Bash,Write, andAgent(for spawning sub-agents). - Sanitization: The skill implements basic validation of the
topic_slug(checking for non-empty string and status) and character-based stripping for arguments, but lacks robust sanitization for complex prompt injection payloads.
Audit Metadata