skills/zircote/mnemonic/search/Gen Agent Trust Hub

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Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 13, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill documentation and implementation reference an external dependency, @tobilu/qmd. It suggests users perform setup and indexing via /mnemonic:qmd-setup, which involves installing or utilizing unverified third-party software outside of a controlled environment.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Several search patterns provided (e.g., rg -i "search term", qmd search "auth") directly interpolate user-provided strings into shell commands. This creates a surface for command injection if the agent does not adequately sanitize shell metacharacters in the user's query.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection as it ingests and 'synthesizes' content from memory files which may be influenced by external data or previous untrusted interactions.
  • Ingestion points: The skill reads .memory.md files from the ${MNEMONIC_ROOT} directory using the Read and Bash tools.
  • Boundary markers: None are defined; the instructions do not require the agent to wrap memory content in protective delimiters or ignore embedded instructions during the synthesis phase.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has broad capabilities including Bash for command execution, Write for file modifications, and Task for initiating sub-agent calls (mnemonic-search-subcall).
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, filtering, or validation of the content retrieved from memory files before it is processed by the agent or passed to synthesis tasks.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Jun 13, 2026, 03:47 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — search