search
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 13, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill documentation and implementation reference an external dependency,
@tobilu/qmd. It suggests users perform setup and indexing via/mnemonic:qmd-setup, which involves installing or utilizing unverified third-party software outside of a controlled environment. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Several search patterns provided (e.g.,
rg -i "search term",qmd search "auth") directly interpolate user-provided strings into shell commands. This creates a surface for command injection if the agent does not adequately sanitize shell metacharacters in the user's query. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection as it ingests and 'synthesizes' content from memory files which may be influenced by external data or previous untrusted interactions.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads
.memory.mdfiles from the${MNEMONIC_ROOT}directory using theReadandBashtools. - Boundary markers: None are defined; the instructions do not require the agent to wrap memory content in protective delimiters or ignore embedded instructions during the synthesis phase.
- Capability inventory: The skill has broad capabilities including
Bashfor command execution,Writefor file modifications, andTaskfor initiating sub-agent calls (mnemonic-search-subcall). - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, filtering, or validation of the content retrieved from memory files before it is processed by the agent or passed to synthesis tasks.
Audit Metadata