wechat-mp-exporter
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 11, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: Fetches external source code from a GitHub repository (
wechat-article/wechat-article-exporter) pinned to a specific commit hash (6b67dfe64f6f359be604239e98f74c1021fc9d5f) and applies a local privacy patch during the Docker backend setup. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: Installs Python dependencies (Selenium, BeautifulSoup4, markdownify) from the official package registry using a hash-locked requirements file (
assets/lite-requirements.lock) to ensure package integrity during the Lite backend installation. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Invokes shell commands via
subprocess.runto manage Git operations and Docker Compose services for the archive backend lifecycle. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Employs
os.execveto re-execute the skill within a dedicated virtual environment, ensuring the Lite backend runs with isolated dependencies. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted article content and metadata from
mp.weixin.qq.com, representing an attack surface for indirect prompt injection. - Ingestion points:
scripts/wechat_mp_exporter.pyandscripts/lite_backend.pyretrieve HTML, text, and Markdown content from external article URLs. - Boundary markers: The skill lacks explicit prompt-level delimiters or instructions to isolate the fetched article content from the agent's primary instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses file-writing capabilities (for local archiving) and command execution capabilities (Git, Docker, and Python subprocesses).
- Sanitization: Content is filtered to specific HTML elements (
#js_content), but the resulting text is not sanitized to remove potential natural language instructions targeting the LLM.
Audit Metadata